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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
No. 9360

THE CHEMICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This proceeding involves the question of whether or not
the plaintiff is liable for the payment of a use tax upon
certain items of tangible personal property used in the construction of an ammonium nitrate plant at or near Geneva,
Utah in 1956.
Plaintiff, The Chemical and Industrial Corporation, is an
Ohio corporation engaged in the business of designing and
contracting for the erection of facilities for the production
of chemical and allied products. Plaintiff is not now, and
was not, during the period January 1, 1956 to December 31,
1956, authorized or qualified to do business in the State of
Utah.
On or about November 9, 1956, plaintiff, as subcontractor,
confirmed an agreement with the Chemical Plants Division,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Blaw-Knox Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as primary contractor for Columbia Geneva Division, United
States Steel Corporation, under the terms of which agreement plaintiff was obligated to furnish all materials, supplies, equipment, labor, services, etc., necessary for the
construction of an ammonium nitrate plant at or near
Geneva, Utah.
Article XVIII of this contract (Record pp. 140-174) provides as follows:
ARTICLE XVIII. The title to all work completed
and in the course of construction at the site and all
materials which are delivered and stored at the site
and which shall necessarily be incorporated in the
work, as between Contractor [Blaw-Knox Company],
Owner [Columbia-Geneva Division, United States Steel
Corporation] and Subcontractor [Plaintiff] shall be in
Owner.
On or about November 23, 1956, the plaintiff confirmed a
contract (Record pp. 138-139) with The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company, a corporation and a whollyowned subsidiary of plaintiff, under the terms of which
contract The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company agreed, among other things, to provide all labor and
services required in the construction of the facilities.
The first paragraph of ARTICLE I of this contract
provides:
ARTICLE I. STATEMENT OF THE WORK
Subcontractor [The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company] upon notice by Contractor [The
Chemical and Industrial Corporation], shall as
promptly and economically as practicable perform the
necessary work and shall furnish all labor, supervision,
tools and equipment to erect and install the equipment,
compressors, machinery and building provided for in
the Principal Contract. The Subcontractor shall also
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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furnish necessary field offices, shops, warehouses and
sheds for the proper prosecution of the work and shall
perform the necessary receiving, unloading, hauling
from the railhead or other delivery point to the job
site, warehousing and handling of the materials and
equipment to be erected and installed under this subcontract.
At all times material hereto, The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company was qualified and authorized
to do business in the State of Utah.
Pursuant to plaintiff's contract with the Blaw-Knox
Company, plaintiff purchased all necessary materials and
supplies required in the performance of the work on the
facilities from vendors not residents of the State of Utah
pursuant to contracts executed outside of the State of
Utah. No sales taxes were paid to such vendors upon the
purchase of such materials and supplies. These materials
were shipped from the vendors' plants or places of business in interstate commerce to the plant site at Geneva,
Utah, where they were received by The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company.
Plaintiff maintained no office or other place of business
in Utah prior to, during or subsequent to the period here
involved, nor were any agents or employees of plaintiff
located permanently at the plant site or elsewhere in the
State of Utah.
On or about July 15, 1957, the defendant issued a proposed use tax tax deficiency assessment against the plaintiff for the period January 1, 1956 through December 31,
1956 in the amount of $20,853.46, plus penalties and interest.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed its petition for redetermination
with the defendant in accordance with applicable provisions of the Use Tax Act. An informal hearing was held
with representatives of the defendant before members of
the Utah State Tax Commission. At this time a stipulation
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of facts (Record pp. 149-174) was entered into by the parties and placed before the State Tax Commission. Thereafter, on December 10, 1957, pursuant to agreement between the parties to file seriatum briefs which, together
with the stipulation of facts, would form the basis for the
State Tax Commission to render its decision, plaintiff filed
its brief with applicable authorities setting forth its position with respect to the imposition of liability upon it.
On September 15, 1958, the defendant transmitted a
Request for Admission of the Genuineness of a Document
(Record p. 67) to plaintiff, to which plaintiff answered
(Record pp. 68-72) objecting to the Request on the grounds
that such Request was not in compliance with Rule 36 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and was otherwise improper. No ruling was made by the defendant on the
Request or on plaintiff's answer thereto.
Subsequently, defendant's brief and plaintiff's reply
brief were filed. No determination was made by the Utah
State Tax Commission as a result of the first hearing, but
instead on April 30, 1959, the defendant issued additional,
identical deficiency assessments in the amount of $20,853.46,
plus penalties and interest against The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company, The Blaw-Knox Company
and United States Steel Corporation. An informal hearing
was held at the offices of the Commission on July 9, 1959,
at which representatives of all four taxpayers were present. On July 14, 1959, the defendant sustained the use tax
deficiencies against all four taxpayers~
On November 12, 1959, a formal hearing was held at the
offices of the Commission, at which representatives of all
four taxpayers were present (Record pp. 4-46). At this
hearing, several iinportant procedural and substantive
questions were raised as to the validity and propriety of
n1ultiple assessments of the same tax and as to conducting
a hearing involving all four taxpayers. This hearing was
adjourned without such questions having been resolved.
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On or about l\!Iarcb 25, 1960, the defendant terminated
the assessn1ents against r:I.,he Chemical and Industrial Construction Company, the Blaw-Knox Company, and the
United States Steel Corporation, and the adjourned hearing of November 12, 1959 was reconvened on May 10, 1960
(Record pp. 47-55). The sole purpose of this hearing was
the introduction into evidence of the prime contract between the Blaw-I{nox Company and Columbia-Geneva
Division, United States Steel Corporation dated July 6,
1956, and the receipt of testimony by the State Tax Commission of the interpretation of this contract by an employee of Columbia-Geneva Division, United States Steel
Corporation. Pursuant to agreement between the parties,
plaintiff was not personally represented at this hearing,
but filed written objections to the introduction of evidence
and testimony at such hearing (Record pp. 56-61).
On September 21, 1960, the defendant issued its decision
numbered 186, entitled ''In the :Matter of the Sales and Use
Tax Deficiency of Chmnical and Industrial Corporation,''
wherein the defendant detennined that the plaintiff was
liable for the payment of a use tax deficiency in the amount
of $20,853.46, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
In its decision, in addition to the above (excepting the
matter of passage of title to the materials under Article
XVIII of pla.intiff's contract, on which defendant 1nade no
finding), the defendant made the following three additional
findings of fact based upon the evidence produced at the
hearing of 1\Iay 10, 1960: (1) that pursuant to the aforementioned prime contract, the Blaw-Knox Company was
required to provide all labor, materials, supplies, etc. not
furnished by Columbia-Geneva Division, United States
Steel Corporation, necessary for the construction of the
facilities ·which vvere the subject of the contract and that
the ''risk of loss'' until con1pletion and acceptance by the
Owner, rnited States Steel Corporation, was on the ConSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tractor, Blaw-Knox Company; (2) that pursuant to such
contract, the Contractor was required to pay all sales, use,
excise and other local taxes; and (3) that this contract was
denominated a "turnkey" contract by the parties, i.e., one
in which the seller or contractor agrees to furnish a completely installed operating plant or facility, and that final
payment therefor is deferred until such plant or facility is
accepted by the purchaser.
Based upon such facts, the defendant made three conclusions of law: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the
materials at the time they ended their transit in interstate
commerce; (2) that the plaintiff was present within the
State of Utah and in possession of the materials used in
the construction of the facility during a taxable moment;
and (3) that the assessment of the deficiency does not
unduly burden interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause or violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On October 20, 1960, plaintiff posted bond satisfactory to
the defendant in compliance with Section 59-16-13 of the
Utah Code, Annotated, and filed its petition for a writ of
certiorari to this Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. OWNERSHIP OF l\iATERIALS UPON WHICH A
USE TAX IS ASSESSED IS ESSENTIAL TO A "USE''
OR "STORAGE" OF' SUCH J\!IATERIALS UNDER
THE UTAH USE TAX ACT OF 1937, AS AMENDED.
A. AT THE TIME THE MATERIALS ENDED
THEIR TRANSIT IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND BECAME SUBJECT TO THE IMPOSITION
OF THE USE TAX PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE
OWNER THEREOF, AND THEREFORE, THERE
WAS NO "TAXABLE MOMENT" DURING
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WHitjH PLAINTIFF vVAS SUBJECT TO THE
Il\1POSITION OF SUCH TAX.
II. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PRESENT WITHIN THE
STATE OF UTAH AT THE TI:ME THE MATERIALS
WERE "USED" OR "STORED" IN THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS, AND THEREFORE IS NOT SUBJECT
TO THE TAXING POWER OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
III. TI-IE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION IN ASSERTING THE LIABILITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF
A USE TAX AGAINST PLAINTIFF, IS ACTING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY, SUCH
ACTION BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
IV. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE A CONTRACT AND CERTAIN TESTIMONY RELATING
THERETO, BETWEEN THIRD PERSONS NOT PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING.
ARGUMENT
I. Ownership of Materials upon Which a Use Tax Is Assessed Is Essential to a "Use" or "Storage" of Such
Materials Under the Utah Use Tax Act of 1937, as
Amended.
From the inception of this proceeding plaintiff's position has been that a use tax could not be asserted against
a person who was not the owner of tangible personal property at the time of the ''storage, use or other consumption''
under the express terms of the Utah Use Tax Act of 1937,
as amended, and that since title to the materials which
were the subject of the assessment passed from the plaintiff under the terms of its contract with the Blaw-Knox
Company at the exact moment of the termination of their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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transit in interstate ·commerce, plaintiff could not be subject to liability for the payment of the tax asserted.
Article XVIII of plaintiff's contract with the Blaw-Knox
Company provides :
ARTICLE XVIII. The title to all work completed
and in the course of construction at the site and all
materials which are delivered and stored at the site
and which shall necessarily be incorporated into the
work, as between Contractor [Blaw-Knox Company],
Owner [United States Steel Corporation] and Subcontractor [The Chemical and Industrial Corporation]
shall be in Owner.
Initially and throughout the early stages of this dispute,
the defendant sought to impose liability for the payment
of a use tax upon plaintiff pursuant to the terms of Sections 59-16-3 and 59-16-2(b), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1956),
the first of which section provides:
There is levied and imposed an excise tax on the
storage, use or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased on or after July 1,
1937, for storage, use or other consumption in this
state at the rate of two per cent of the sale price of
such property.
Every person storing, using· or consuming in this
state tangible personal property purchased shall be
liable for the tax imposed by this Act, and the liability
therefore shall not be extinguished until the tax has
been paid to this state.
The term "use" is defined in Section 59-16-2 (b), Utah
Code Ann. ( Supp. 1956) as :
''Use'' nwans and includes the exercise of any right
or power over tangible personal property incident to
the ownership of that property, except that it shall not
include the sale, display, demonstration, or trial of
that property in the regular course of business and
held for resale.
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At the formal hearing held on November 12, however, the
defendant receded from its original position that there was
a taxable "use" by the plaintiff, and asserted at that time
that the basis of the imposition of the use tax upon plaintiff was that title to the materials did not pass until they
were stored at the site and since plaintiff had ''stored'' the
materials in question it was liable for the use tax by reason
of such storage.
Section 59-16-2(a) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1956) provides as follows :
"Storage" means and includes any keeping or retention in this state for any purpose except sale in
the regular course of business all tangible personal
property purchased from a retailer.
Plaintiff believes that the defendant's construction of
Article ·XVIII is erroneous, that title to the materials
passed upon delivery, and that the use of the phrase ''and
stored" is intended simply to distinguish between: (1)
materials which are immediately incorporated "in the
course of construction" of the work upon delivery; and
(2) materials which would be stored temporarily before
incorporation "in the course of construction" of the work,
in order to insure that title to all items, regardless of the
status of completion of the project, would be in the Owner.
Even assuming the correctness of defendant's construction of Article XVIII, plaintiff submits that the assertion
of liability on the basis of distinction between a "use"
and a ''storage,'' as applied to the facts in this case, is a
distinction without substance or legal effect and provides
no basis for the imposition of the use tax upon plaintiff in
this case.
Apparently the defendant is under the impression that
ownership of tangible personal property is not an essential condition to the imposition of the use tax where the
liability is asserted on the basis of ''storage'' rather than
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"use." Plaintiff submits that the defendant's assumption
is incorrect and not supported by the authorities.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939),
the Supreme Court upheld the application of the California
Use Tax Act where the taxpayer, the Southern Pacific
Company, purchased goods outside of the State of California for delivery at its various places of operation within
the State of California. In rejecting the argument of the
taxpayer that the particular items of tangible personal
property involved were not subject to the imposition of a
use tax by reason of the fact that these materials upon
arrival at their destination at the company's places of
business in California were immediately placed into its
business operations which were in interstate commerce,
the court stated at 177:
We think there was a taxable moment when the former
[materials] had reached the end of their interstate
transportation and had not begun to be consumed in
interstate operation. At that moment the tax on storage and use-retention and exercise of a right of ownership, respectively-was effective. (Emphasis added.)
In a companion case, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. 182 (1939), the Supreme Court stated at 187:
The appellant exercised two rights of ownership
in California-retention and installation-after the
termination of the interstate shipment and before the
use or consumption on its mixed interstate and intrastate telephone system. We see no material distinction between the contentions of the appellant and those
disposed of in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher. ...
It is noted that in both these decisions there was no
question of passage of title or change of ownership of the
materials involved. In addition, it is also important to
note that the definitions of "use" and "storage" were identical to those contained in the Utah Act.
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Clearly the tax imposed in these decisions was based
upon the fact that the taxpayers had retained and exercised rights of ownership in the property and it was these
acts which gave rise to the validity of the application of
the tax in those cases.
Similarly, in Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn.
161, 140 A.2d 479 (1958), the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut, in construing the provisions of its Use
Tax Act, which provisions are substantially the same as
those utilized in the Utah Act, stated at 173, 140 A.2d at
485:
It seems clear that storage and consumption as well
as use, must be incident to ownership for the use tax
to apply. To construe the statute otherwise, so as to
purport to tax the use of the facilities under the cLrcumstances in this case would raise a constitutional
question where, as here, the owner was the United
States.
Thus the question of ownership of the materials at the
time when they became subject to the taxing power of the
state is critical in any determination of liability for the
payment of a use tax. It is equally clear that in order to
subject plaintiff to liability for the payment of the use
tax in the present case, the "taxable moment" at which
time the materials here involved became subject to the
levy of a use tax by the State of Utah, must occur prior
to the change in ownership of the materials.

A. At the Time the Materials Ended Their Transit in Interstate Commerce and Became Subject to the Imposition of the Use Tax Plaintiff Was Not the Owner
Thereof, and Therefore, There Was No "Taxable Moment" During Which Plaintiff Was Subject to the Imposition of Such Tax.
The principle that a state excise tax upon the privilege
of operating in, or carrying on interstate commerce is inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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valid, is so well established that citations of authority to
support it are unnecessary. However, it is also well established that there is a point at which the interstate transit
is completed but the interstate consumption has not begun.
At this point materials may be subjected to a nondiscrimitory state tax levied upon the exercise of a right of ownership in the property. Pacific Tel. <f; Tel. Co. v. Gallagher,
supra; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
Thus, in addition to the matter of the change of ownership, the determination of the point at which the interstate transit is completed is also of critical importance in
the application of state use tax acts.
The landmark case in this area of the law is Minnesota
v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933). In this decision the Supreme
Court set forth the standard for a determination of when
interstate transportation is ended and property becomes
subject to the taxing power of the states. The Court stated
at 10:
Formalities, such as the forms of billing, and mere
changes in the method of transportation do not affect
the continuity of transit. The question is always one
of substance, and in each case it is necessary to consider the particular occasion or purpose of the interruption during which the tax is sought to be levied....
Where property has come to rest within a State,
being held there at the pleasure of the owner, for disposal or use, so that he may dispose of it ·within the
State or· for shipment elsewhere, as his interest dictates, it is deemed to be a part of the general mass of
property within the State and is thus subject to its
taxing power.
This Court has expressed its agreen1ent with the standard established in the Blasius case. In Geneva Steel Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949),
this Court stated at 176, 269 P.2d at 211:
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The sal(' of property made outside this state is not
subject to our sales tax, it being a sale which this
state cannot constitutionally tax. But when such property is brought into this state for storage, use or other
consumption here, thus coming to rest as an integrated
part of the total property in this state, then the use
tax goes into operation and taxes, not the event of the
sale of the property, but the event of storage, use or
other consumption of that property within this state.
Although it would appear to be hypertechnical to require
some further clarification of the above standard for determinii_lg when interstate transportation ends, probably no
other area of the law has involved so many decisions in
which the validity and applicability of various state laws
have turned upon just such technical distinctions.
Fortunately, ho·wever, this Court has been called upon in
the past to detern1ine the precise question ·with which we
are presently concerned-that point in time when interstate transportation of tangible personal property ends. In
illud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah2d -85, 269 P.2d
83-l- (1954), the plaintiff was attempting to assert a cause
of action for breach of contract in the courts of Utah. The
lower court returned a judgn1ent for the plaintiff for a
portion of its claim, but held that it was not entitled to
maintain an action in Utah for n1aterials sold prior to the
time it qualified to do business in Utah. Plaintiff, on appeal, contended that the sales n1ade prior to qualification
·were in interstate commerce and therefore there ''·'as no
requirement of qualification. This Court stated at 89, 269
P.2d at 856-7:
The principles in the foregoing cases are applicable
to the fact situation \Ye have here. :Mud Control products were trucked into Vernal, Utah, ·where they were
placed on the property of one L. N. Liscmnbe and
there kept under tarpaulins pending sale . . . .· vVhen
such products were deposited for warehousing subject
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to distribution upon orders to be taken, their transit
in interstate commerce had come to an end. Subsequent sales by Mud Control were intrastate commerce
and subject to regulation by the laws of Utah.
The above authorities establish two essential elements
to the imposition of liability for the payment of a use tax:
(1) In order to be subject to a tax, the "use" or "storage"
must be based upon the exercise of some right of ownership over the property upon which the tax is sought to
be levied; (2) the taxable "event" or "moment" must occur
after the property has come to rest in the state and after
the interstate transportation of the materials has ended.
Returning now to Article XVIII of plaintiff's contract, it
is apparent that title to the materials passed to ColumbiaGeneva Division, United States Steel Corporation at the
moment of delivery at the site or at the very latest no later
than at the exact ~oment those materials were placed on
the ground at the plant site near Geneva, Utah. There
can be little doubt as to the meaning of this provision of
the contract and it is axiomatic that clear, unequivocal
language of a contract will be given effect. In those decisions where similar contract language was considered, the
courts clearly indicated that title to materials utilized in
construction contracts passed according to the terms of
the contract. See· Alabama v. King&; Boozer, 314 U. S. 1
(1941); Ford J. Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission,
106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944); General Motors Corp.
v. State Ta.x Commission, 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 807
(1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 875 (1958).
It is equally clear that the interstate transportation of
the materials with which we are here concerned did not
terminate until such materials were deposited on the ground
at the plant site near Geneva, Utah.
The fallacy of the defendant's Conclusions of Law that
plaintiff was the owner of the Inaterials at the time they
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ended their interstate transportation and was in possession thereof during a "taxable moment" thus becomes
readily apparent. In order for the plaintiff to be subject
to liability for the payment of this tax, the "taxable moment" must occur prior to the storage of materials and at
some time during the course of delivery. This is, in effect,
a tax upon the sale of the property rather than upon its
use or storage and would be an unconstitutional attempt
by the Utah State Tax Commission to exceed its powers
and impose a tax where no right to assert such a tax
exists. In this connection, the admonition of the Supreme
Court in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra, and in McLeod v. J. E. Dillworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 331 (1943), is
significant. In the Silas Mason Co. case the Court stated
at 583:

A tax upon a use so closely connected with delivery
as to be in substance a part thereof, might be subject
to the same objections that would be applicable to tax
upon the sale itself.
This statement was repeated and reaffirmed in the J. E.
Dillworth case.
And in Mill.er Bros. v. Maryland; 347 U. S. 340 (1954),
the Court stated at 344:
We do not understand the State to contend that it
could lay a use tax upon mere possession of goods in
transit by a carrier or vendor upon entering the State
nor do we see how such tax could be consistent with
the Commerce Clause.
Conversely, if it is the intent of the defendant that the
"taxable moment" occurred at a point any time after the
materials were placed upon the ground at the plant site,
the plaintiff would still not be subject to the tax since
plaintiff was then no longer the owner of the materials
and the exercise of a right of ownership is an essential element of a valid levy of the use tax.
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II. Plaintiff Was Not Present within the State of Utah at
the Time the Materials Were "Used" or "Stored" in the
Construction Process, and Therefore Is Not Subject to
the Ta,xing Power of the State of Utah.
In addition to the above there is a third element essential to a valid levy of a state use tax: that the owner be
present within the state at the time the taxable use occurs.
The question of "presence" in the state of the forum of
foreign corporations, not only for purposes of taxation, but
also for purposes of service of process and qualification to
do business, has been one of the most frequently litigated
questions in the area of constitutional law.
Although the cases in this area are legion, it is almost
impossible to ascertain any overriding principle which will
be determinative in all sets of circumstances. It is generally agreed, however, that there are different degrees of
"presence" or "doing business" for purposes of determining whether or not a foreign corporation is subject to the
laws of the state of the forum for service of process, qualification and taxation. Most authorities are in accord that
some sort of continuing business activity is necessary in
order to require the qualification of a foreign corporation.
Business activity amounting to something less than that
of a continuing nature is required to subject a foreign corporation to the taxing power of the state in "'Nhich such
activity is conducted, and finally, still less activity is required in order to subject a foreign corporation to service
of process in the state of the forum.
This Court has recently revie·wed the significant cases in
the area of jurisdiction for purposes of serYice of process
and has most succinctly set forth the broad standard or
guide in determining the question. In Conn v. TVhitmore,
9 Utah2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) this Court stated at 254:
Even under the liberalized view the foregoing cases
represent as to the prerequisites to holding one subject
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to personal jurisdiction of courts of a foreign state, this
requirement remains: there must be some substantial
activity which correlates with a purpose to engage in
a course of business or some continuity of activity in
the state so that deeming the defendant to be present
therein is founded upon a realistic basis and is not a
mere fiction. That this is so and that a single act or
transaction does not suffice unless it fits into the above
pattern, is well established.
In the more limited area of decisions dealing with jurisdiction for purposes of service of process over foreign
corporations engaged in the sale of goods and their delivery
within the state of the forum, the Supreme Court of Utah
in Dykes v. R.eliable Furniture & Carpet, 3 Utah2d 34, 277
P.2d 969 (1954) held that the defendant seller with no
office, files, facilities, equipment, books, bank accounts, telephone listing, advertising, samples, property, or employees
in Utah, and whose orders were secured by an independent
contractor who submitted them to the defendant for acceptance, was not doing business within the state for purposes of service of process. This Court stated at 36, 277
P.2d at 971:
We believe the principles heretofore announced by
us are applicable to this case and support our conclusion, as are the decisions of many respectable authorities elsewhere. All authorities are not in complete
harmony but most agree that certain activities do not
constitute "doing business" in the jurisdictional sense,
giving us a few guide posts to detennine cases as they
arise. That mere solicitation cannot confer jurisdiction, all will agree. In the vVestern Gas Appliances'
case, cited herein, 1Ir. Justice Crockett pointed out a
number of other activities authoritatively determined
as not "doing business" for process purposes; 1) mere
presence of an officer in the forum, 2) a factory sale
to a local distributor, 3) instruction to retailers in aid
of distributors' aid promotion, 4) warranting and shipSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ping parts to an independent dealer, 5) isolated cases
of equipment installation. Others might be added.
In the area of jurisdiction for purposes of qualification,
in Riley Stoker Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 3 Utah2d
164, 280 P.2d 967 (1955) the appellant sold, delivered and
constructed four large steam generating plants in the State
of Utah. It contended this activity was interstate commerce
and that it was not liable for the payment of corporate
franchise taxes. This Court stated at 167, 280 P.2d at 968:
It is recognized that not only contracts for the sale
and shipment of machinery or equipment from out of
the state into Utah are interstate commerce, but further that incidental services in assembling, inspecting
and testing of such equipment does not deprive it of its
interstate character.
Here the court held that the appellant's activities in Utah
were more than merely "incidental" to the sale and shipment of the goods.
If the defendant in the Reliable Furniture d!; Carpet case
was not present for purposes of service of process and if
shipment of goods and some incidental assembling services
does not amount to presence for purposes of qualification
under the Riley Stoker Corp. case, it is clear that plaintiff,
who engaged in no activities within the State of Utah, is
likewise not subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah
for purposes of service of process, qualification or taxation.
Apparently the defendant is attempting to ascribe the
presence of The Chemical and Industrial Construction
Company in Utah to the plaintiff, regarding them as one
for purposes of asserting the liability for the payment of
the use tax in this case. Plaintiff submits that no legal
basis or justification exists for such a determination.
At no time did plaintiff enter into the State of Utah to
engage In, supervise or in any way or manner direct the
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construction of the facilities at or near Geneva, Utah. All
of the construction work, including the direction and supervision thereof, was performed by The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company to whom plaintiff subcontracted the work of erecting these facilities. In order to
sustain a finding that plaintiff was present in the State of
Utah for purposes of the application of the use tax, it will
be necessary to disregard the separate corporate entities
of the two firms, or to show that The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company was merely an agent or instrumentality of plaintiff. Neither of these determinations is
supported by law.
The mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship,
even though the parent exercises considerable control over
the affairs of the subsidiary, is not sufficient basis for disregarding the separate corporate entities, nor does such a
relationship of itself constitute the subsidiary an "agent"
of the parent company. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925).
Unless it appears that a true agency relationship exists
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary, the separate identities of the corporations will not be disregarded
for tax purposes. Thus, in Board of Tax Supervisors v.
Baldwin Piano Co., 296 Ky. 673, 178 S.W.2d 212 (1944) it
appeared that The Baldwin Company was the sole owner of
The Baldwin Piano Company, except for qualifying shares,
the former being the manufacturing company and not
authorized or qualified to do .business in the State of
Kentucky; the latter being a sales company and qualified
to do business in Kentucky. The Baldwin Piano Company
purchased musical instruments from The Baldwin Company, the latter crediting on its books the purchase price of
the instruments sold. As the sales company sold the instruments in Kentucky, they assigned their accounts receivable
to the parent company, these accounts being entered on the
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books of The Baldwin Company offsetting the amounts due
on the purchase price of the instruments. The State of
Kentucky sought to impose an intangible tax on these accounts receivable, contending that the Piano Company was
merely a cloak used to defraud the state out of its taxes
and as such the two corporations should be regarded as
one entity for tax purposes. The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied the contentions of the Board of T·ax Supervisors, stating at 678, 178 S.W.2d at 214:
Here Piano was not formed to shield Baldwin from
liability for fraud or unethical business transactions .
. . . Piano was not. the mere agent or instrumentality
of Baldwin, nor were the business affairs between them
fictional, nor was the method of doing business a plan
to illegally evade taxes. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v.
Comm., 208 Ky. 606,271 S.W. 693.
Similarly, in State ex rel. Porterie v. Gulf, Mobile & N.
R.R., 191 La. 163, 184 So. 711 (1938) the court held that an
almost wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant was liable
for the payment of an excise tax upon gasoline imported
into Louisiana, rather than the parent company, as contended by the Louisiana taxing authorities. Here the two
companies had practically the same managerial personnel,
principal officers and boards of directors. They operated
out of the same general offices. One man, acting as purchasing agent for the two corporations, ordered gasoline
in the parent's name, the gasoline being consigned to the
subsidiary in Louisiana, stored there and subsequently
used by the subsidiary in the course of its business operations within the state.
Since the contract here involved was executed in Ohio
and is governed by Ohio law, the decisions of the Ohio
courts 1nust be considered. In Cou,ncell v. D.ouglas, 163
Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1957) the Supreme Court of
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Ohio elaborated on the test to be applied in determining
whether the relationship between parties is that of ''principal and agent'' or "employer and independent contractor"
when it quoted with approval the syllabus of an earlier
Ohio decision, Hughes v. Railway Co., 39 Ohio St. 461
(1883) at 296-297, 126 N.E.2d at 600:
'' 2. A corporation organized for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad . . . may contract
with another person for the construction of the whole
or any part of the road, without retaining the right to
control the mode or manner of doing the work. ...
3. But if the corporation retain control over the
mode and manner of doing the work, the relation of
independent contractor does not exist. . . .
4. A right reserved in the contract, on the part of
the railroad company, to direct as to the quantity of
work to be done, or the condition of the work when
completed is not a right to control the mode or manner
of doing the work, within the rule above stated.
This basic principle has been approved in almost·all American jurisdictions, including Utah. See Dayton v. Free, 46
Utah 277, 148 Pac. 408 (1914).
The terms of plaintiff's contract with The Chemical and
Industrial Construction Company make it abundantly clear
that plaintiff retained no right to control the mode or
manner of the doing of the work. All supervison was to
be provided by the subcontractor, subject only to plaintiff's
right of final acceptance upon the completion of the work.
It is submitted, in the light of the above, that the relationship between plaintiff and The Chemical and Industrial
Construction Company is that of employer and independent
contractor; that there is no basis for attributing an agency
relationship to such agreement or for disregarding the legal
entity of these corporations, and, accordingly, plaintiff was
not present within the State of Utah. Thus plaintiff could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
not have "used" or "stored" in Utah the materials upon
which tax liability is asserted.

III. The· State Tax Commission in Asserting Liability for
the Payment of a Use Tax against. Plaintiff Is Acting
beyond the Scope of Its Authority, Such Action Being
in Violation of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
It is a well settled principle of constitutional law that the
taxing power of a state is limited to subjects within its
jurisdiction, and that the seizure of property by the state
under pretext of taxation when there is no jurisdiction or
power to tax is simple confiscation and a denial of due
process of law. Thus, in the early case of St. Louis v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 423, 430 (1871) it
was said:
''Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person
nor property, the imposition of a tax would be ultra
vir-es and void. If the legislature of a state should
enact that citizens or property of another state or
country should be taxed in the same manner as persons and property within its own limits and subject
to its authority, or in any manner whatsoever, such a
law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with
the most explicit constitutional inhibition. Jurisdiction is as necessary to valid legislative as to valid
judicial action.... ' '
Before there can be a valid exercise of the state's taxing
power over persons not present within its borders, it must
appear that there is a sufficient connection, certain minimum contracts sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process between the person upon whom the tax is sought to
be imposed and the state seeking to exert such taxing
power. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310
(1945) ; Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344-5
(1954).
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The question in each case is whether the person upon
whom the tax is sought to be imposed, by its acts or course
of dealing, has subjected itself to the taxing power of the
state. There can be little question as to the validity, in so
far as. constitutional questions of due process of law are
concerned, of a state use tax applied to a corporation which
enters into the taxing state, conducts part of its business
operations there and actually uses items of tangible personal property in that state even though such items were
purchased outside of the taxing state. Pacific Tel. <f; Tel.
Co. v. Gallagher, supra; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
s'upra. Similarly, where a foreign corporation has localized
its business within the taxing state by maintaining either
its general offices, Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, supra,
or a branch office from which permanent general agents
operate, Felt <f; Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S.
62 ( 1939), or storage and refining facilities, M onamotor
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934), the imposition of
a use tax has been sustained. In each of the cases the
person upon whom tax liability was imposed had, by its
acts and manner of conducting business, engaged in business activities within the taxing state, and by so doing
had subjected itself to the taxing power of that state.
However, plaintiff is aware of no decided case which imposed tax liability upon a foreign corporation under circumstances approximating those in the instant case. There
was no solicitation of business within the state of Utah; no
office or place of business was maintained there, and no
employees of plaintiff conducted any of plaintiff's business
from within the state; and none of the contracts involved
herein were made in Utah. Plaintiff's only link with the
state of Utah was the delivery, by common carrier, of goods
purchased outside of the state of Utah pursuant to contracts
made outside of Utah, to the job site at Geneva, Utah.
Thus, tpere was no "nexus," no "minimum contacts" with
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the state of Utah to support, consistent with constitutional
"due process," the imposition of the tax in this case.
What has been stated previously with reference to the
matter of the termination of the interstate transportation
of these materials, makes it equally clear that the assertion
of a use tax against plaintiff here is contrary to the principles announced in the Blasius; Silas Mason Co., and Covey
cases: that a tax upon the interstate transportation of
goods, rather than a tax upon their use, storage or other
consumption once they have come to rest and become a part
of the mass of property within the state, places an undue
burden upon interstate commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause of the U. S. Constitution.
It is submitted that the principles set forth in the above
decisions are decisive of the· question of the constitutional
validity of the Utah use tax as applied to plaintiff. The
Chemical and Industrial Corporation did not engage in any
business activities in the state of Utah which would subject
it to the taxing power of that state. Nor can phiintiff's
presence in the state of Utah be attributed to the facl that
the construction work was perforn1ed and supervised by
The Chemical and Industrial Construction Company. The
imposition of such tax by the State Tax Con1mission is an
unconstitutional attempt to extend the taxing power of the
state over subjects not within its jurisdiction in contravention of the C01nmerce Clause mi.d the Fourteenth ArnendInent to the U. S. Constitution.

IV. The Utah State Tax Commission Improperly Admitted
into Evidence a Contract and Certain Testimony Relating Thereto, betwe·en Third Persons Not Parties to
This Proceeding.
The defendant has exerted considerable effort in the
proceedings below to have the contract between the Chemical Plants Division, Bla\Y-l(nox C01npany and Columbia
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Geneva Division, U. S. Steel Corporation (Record pp. 80131) admitted into evidence, apparently on the assumption
that this contract is somehow determinative of the question
of passage of title to the materials used in the construction
of the facilities at Geneva, Utah. Plaintiff has maintained
throughout these proceedings that this contract is not
determinative of the matter of passage of title to the
materials involved but also, being a contract between third
persons not parties to this proceeding, is not relevant or
material to the issues involved here, and is otherwise
incompetent.
In General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220 (7th
Cir. 1948), wherein a decision of an administrative officer of
the Commodity Credit Corporation was reversed, the court
stated at 225:
The government cites no authority in support of its
right to use proof as to the statements and activities
of one party against another in the absence of a conspiracy, agreement or a relationship kindred thereto .
. . . It is true, of course, as asserted by the government,
that strict rules of procedure, including the admissibility of evidence, inherent in criminal and common
law proceedings are not applicable to administrative
proceedings. But no court, as far as we are aware,
and we do not propose to be the first, has held in an
administrative proceeding or any other kind that one
person can be responsible for the actions of another in
the absence of a conspiracy or agreement.
Cf. Saxton v. TV. S. Askew Co., 38 F.Supp. 323 (N. D. Ga.
1941).
Similarly, in Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemploy1nent
C01npensation Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super, 534, 79
A.2d 796 (1951), the Superior Court reversed a proceeding
of the Unemployment Compensation Board where the
Board admitted into evidence a letter from a person not a
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party to the proceeding over objection by one of the
parties. The court stated that this document was incompetent and inadmissible. Although the Board was not required to conform to the common law or statutory rules of
evidence, where a timely objection is made to incompetent
evidence, it is nevertheless not admissible. See also Phillips
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 152 Pa.
Super. 75, 30 A.2d 718 (1943).
Although the contract in question has some remote relevancy to the question of the passage of title to the materials
involved, this relevancy lacks sufficient materiality to this
question to justify its admission into evidence by the State
Tax Commission. Its admission, in addition to the fact
that it is incompetent evidence in this proceeding, served
merely to confuse the issues involved and to unduly prolong the proceedings. Once having been admitted, however,
it is clear that the entire contract must be examined and
considered in order to ascertain its effect.
Contrary to the construction placed upon this contract
by the defendant, an examination of the entire contract
supports plaintiff's position with respect to the matter of
the passage of title to materials upon which the tax is
asserted. Although there is no provision in this contract
equivalent to Article XVIII of plaintiff's contract with the
Blaw-Knox Company, Paragraph 5 does provide, in part:
. . . Owner shall pay Contractor progress payments
on account of the contract price against estimates of
percentage of completion made by Contractor and approved by Owner for ninety per cent (90%) of the
proportionate price of services rendered, materials and
equipment delivered, field work performed and other
expenses incurred, said payments to be made by Owner
within ten (10) days af~er submission of each invoice
therefor. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Under Paragraph 5 the United States Steel Corporation
is paying for work as it is performed and for materials as
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they are delivered. There is nothing inconsistent in this
provision of the contract with a determination that title
to the materials passed upon delivery at the site. Where a
person contracts to sell goods and delivers such goods to
the buyer and the buyer has contracted to pay the seller
for them, it is a completed sale. Nothing remains to be
done to effect a transfer of title. See 46 Am. Jur. Sales,
Sections 411 et seq. (1939); Jones v. Commercial Investment Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924).
A reading of the transcript of the hearing of May 10,
1960 (Record pp. 47-55) indicates that counsel for the
defendant was unwilling to rest his case to support his
contention that the contract alone was determinative of
the time of passage of title to the materials. After the
contract was introduced, a series of leading questions
(Record pp. 52-53) were directed to an employee of the
United States Steel Corporation, a Mr. Maynard Gage,
which elicited the desired testimony: to the effect that the
interpretation placed upon this contract by Mr. Gage (or
United States Steel) was that title to the materials did not
pass until completion and final acceptance of the contract.
These questions and the answers they elicited were
highly improper and clearly inadmissible on several
grounds not the least of which is that the conclusions made
by Mr. Gage are absolutely and unmistakably erroneous.
First, once the written contract was introduced in evidence, its terms could not be varied, altered, contradicted
or added to by oral testimony. It is well established that
oral evidence is not admissible to contradict, add to or vary
a written instrument. Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105
Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (1943); Garrett v. Ellison, 93
Utah 184, 72 P.2d 449 (1937). There is no provision in
defendant's Exhibit No. 4 covering the passage of title to
the materials used in the construction of the facilities at
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pretation" of the contract is adding a provision thereto
which is not contained in its express terms.
Second, since there is no express provision in the con tract
relating to the passage of title of the materials, it is clear
that Mr. Gage is merely expressing his own opinion as to
this question. There has been no showing that Mr. Gage
is an "expert" on contract interpretation; that he is by
training or profession qualified to express such an opinion.
It is also well established that unless a witness is qualified
as an expert, he cannot be permitted to express an opinion
as to a matter to be determined by the trier of fact.
In Upton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 573, 223 P.2d 428 (1950)
the plaintiff, in an action to quiet title to real estate, sought
to introduce a letter from a referee in bankruptcy in Colorado expressing an opinion as to the tax title of the plaintiff to the real estate. The Supreme Court of Utah held that
such evidence was clearly inadmissible opinion evidence on
issues that were to be decided by the court in which the
suit was initiated.
This rule is equally applicable to administrative proceedings. In Ryan v. New York State Liquor Authority, 273
App. Div. 576, 79 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1948), the court stated
that in administrative proceedings witnesses should not be
permitted to testify as to their opinions, conclusions and
inferences. Similarly, in State Board v. Thomasson, 65
Dauph. 110 (Pa.Com.Pls.) the court held that in a proceeding before an administrative agency, witnesses may not
be permitted to express opinions of facts to which they are
testifying. Testimony which thus amounts to a legal conclusion is incompetent and inadmissible. Such conclusions
are to be drawn only by the administrative body on the
basis of facts adduced before it.
Finally, and of particular importance, it is painfully
obvious that Mr. Gage's "interpretation" of the contract
is contrary to its terms and contrary to law. \Ve take it
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that there is no dispute that throughout the period of
construction the title to the real estate upon which these
facilities were constructed was in United States Steel Corporation. See in this connection, Geneva Steel Co. v. State
Tax Commission, supra. There has never been anything,
in evidence, the correspondence, or otherwise, which would
indicate that this was not a fact. The only question relates
to the time of passage of title· to the personalty. Although
it is far from clear as to which of the provisions of the
contract Mr. Gage is relying upon to support his "interpretation" of the contract, we assume that it is, at least
in part, based upon Paragraph 24 thereof. An examination
of this section discloses, however, no mention or reference
to any passage of title either to materials used or to the
plant itself. It is obvious that "acceptance" as used in this
section relates only to the guarantees of operating performance of the completed facility, a standard provision in
contracts of this type.
The contention that "title" to anything passed pursuant
to the operation of Section 24 is absurd. United States Steel
Corporation already owned the real estate and in the
absence of a provision to the contrary in the contract, local
law must determine the passage of title to personalty.
It is a uniformly accepted proposition that once personalty is affixed or annexed to the land, it becomes a part
of the land and title passes to the landowner. See 22 Am.
Jur. Fixtures, § 2 (1939). This is the law of Utah. See
Heiselt Construction Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 176 F.2d
207 (lOth Cir. 1949); Heiselt Construction Co. v. Garff, 119
Utah 164, 225 P.2d 720 (1950). Under Paragraph 23 of defendant's Exhibit No. 4, matters relating to the construction of the contract are expressly made subject to the laws
of the State of Utah.
If Mr. Gage's interpretation of the contract were correct
and if there were a breach of the contract by United States
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Steel at any time prior to "final acceptance" under the contract, Blaw-Knox would have every right to dismantle the
entire plant, piece by piece, and haul it away, since, according to Mr. Gage, they still had title to the plant. Plaintiff
has no hesitation in saying that this is not United States
Steel's understanding of the rights of the parties to this
contract.
Throughout the course of the proceedings below the
defendant has sought to nullify the effect of Article XVIII
of plaintiff's contract with Blaw-Knox Company by stating
that plaintiff cannot, by the terms of its contract with
Blaw-Knox Company, impose liability for the payment of
the use tax upon Columbia-Geneva Division, United States
Steel Corporation. Plaintiff has never contended that
United States Steel was the proper party upon which to
impose liability for the payment of the tax. Plaintiff's
position is simply that it is not liable for the payment of
this tax. In view of the fact that plaintiff has not urged
defendant to impose liability against any of the other parties to these transactions, defendant's argument would
appear to have little merit.
Plaintiff would further direct the court's attention to
three additional points: (1) It is noted that Article XVIII
of the contract between plaintiff and Blaw-Knox Company
is contained in the printed form of contract provided by
Blaw-Knox Company and accordingly is a part of the
contract at the direction of Blaw-Knox Company, not
plaintiff. Provisions similar to Article XVIII of plaintiff's
contract are frequently included in construction contracts
at the request of owners because of the protection they
afford as a defense to possible claims of subcontractors or
materialmen, i.e., in replevin actions or actions for the
recovery of the materials delivered. Plaintiff submits that
this provision was inserted in the contract by Blaw-Knox
Company for a definite purpose and that such provision
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cannot be effective for the purpose of protecting the owner
against claims of subcontractors on the one hand, and ignored when its effect might work to the detriment of the
owner; (2) In any event, United States Steel Corporation
protected itself from any tax liability which might result
from the contract and the construction of the facilities by
providing in Paragraph 15 that the Contractor (Blaw-Knox
Company) was required to indemnify and hold the Owner
(United States Steel Corporation) harmless from any liability for any state or local taxes; (3) United States Steel
was certainly aware of the fact that Blaw-Knox intended
to subcontract a portion of the prime contract to plaintiff.
The letter of June 1, 1955 from Mr. Lester of the Bla wKnox Company to Mr. Purvance (Record pp. 94-95) refers
to quotations of C. and I. (The Chemical and Industrial
Corporation).
In summary it is plaintiff's position that this contract,
and the testimony relating thereto, were not competent
evidence in this proceeding and that the adn1ission of such
evidence was error. Even if the admission of such evidence
is not deemed reversible error, however, the contract supports plaintiff's position with respect to the matter of the
passage of title to the materials used in the construction
the facilities for the United States Steel Corporation
nt GPneva, Utah.

of

V. Conclusion.

Plaintiff could not have "used" or "stored" the n1aterials
in question in view of the fact that by the express tern1s of
its contract, the ownership of such materials passed to
another upon their delivery and storage within the State
of rtah, nor could plaintiff have "used" or "stored" materials within the State of Utah as required by the Utah Use
Tax Act of 1937, as amended, since it did not engage in
nny activities within the State other than the delivery of
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materials in interstate commerce to the job site. The activities of plaintiff's wholly-owned subsidiary are not attributable to it on an agency basis, because under their contract
a relationship of employer-independent contractor, rather
than principal and agent, was created.
Any attempt by the State Tax Commission to subject
plaintiff to use tax liability under these circumstances constitutes an attempt to expand the scope of its taxing power
over subjects beyond its lawful control, and as such is in
contravention of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, and, in addition, deprives plaintiff of its
property without due process of law as g~aranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The State Tax Commission committed error in admitting
a contract between third persons not parties to the proceeding below, but even if no error was committed, such
evidence does not support or provide any basis for the
conclusions of law determined by the defendant.
Plaintiff prays that the decision of the defendant, Utah
State Tax Commission, be reversed and that plaintiff be
discharged from all liability for payment of any use tax in
connection therewith.
Respectfully submitted,

JERRY

L. CowAN,

FROST

&

JACOBS,

2300 Union Central Building,
Cincinnati 2, Ohio,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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